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Is This the End of the Eurozone? 
By Jonathan Gosper
* 
 
  As  financial  and  economic  turmoil  continues  to  rock  the  Eurozone  nations  and  even 
threatens  to  undermine  the  political  stability  in  the  region,  it  may  be  helpful  to  recall  the 
circumstances that helped bring about the formation of the European Union and the common 
currency of the Eurozone. While issues of trade, finance, and economics were at the heart of 
many of the agreements upon which the European Union was founded, there were larger issues 
about  a  shared  future  for  Europeans  that  went  beyond  fiscal  concerns.  As  the  economic 
conditions in Europe and the rest of the world appear to have brought the Eurozone to the brink 
of collapse, the question at hand is whether the strength of the euro and the economies of the 
Eurozone nations will be able to withstand the forces that threaten not just the economic ties 
among the nations of the Eurozone and the EU, but that also strain the historical, cultural, and 
political foundations on which those economic ties were forged. 
 
I. Historical Background 
As the United States, the Soviet Union, and the nations of Europe shook off the ashes of 
World War II, it was clear that new lines of power and influence had been drawn. It was the 
dawn of the “Superpower” age, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. emerging from the conflagration 
as the dominant global forces. While allied with the U.S., Europe fairly cowered in the shadow 
of the Soviet Union. The dream of a unified Europe was no longer just a dream; for many, it 
seemed  a  necessity.  Recognizing  that  a  unified  Europe  could  compete  politically  and 
economically with the ideological enemy of Communism, political and business leaders began to 
forge the alliances and draw up the treaties that would eventually lead to the European Union. 
The political union at the heart of the EU has been remarkably solid, but the economic union has 
been rocked by unforeseen turbulence. Despite the best efforts of those who forged this alliance, 
the current state of the euro and the Eurozone threatens to destroy the EU itself.  
Though this union would be a political one, at its heart it was an economic partnership: a 
unified  economy  built  around  a  common  currency  would  eliminate  the  trade  barriers  that 
currently divided one nation from another (McCormick, 2010).  The strength of the new alliance 
drove the euro to prominence; it is now among the most important currencies in the world, and 
the economic activity within European Union is the world’s biggest market (McCormick, 2010). 
The planners who developed the European Union and the euro designed the alliance and the 
currency to withstand the stresses and shocks of turbulent markets and the turbulence of political 
shock and stresses.  Despite having been designed with the best of intentions, however, the euro 
and the European Union have, in their relatively brief lives, faced a series of challenges the likes 
of which had not- and perhaps could not have- been foreseen. 
The euro serves as a tangible symbol of the European Union. From the outset, those 
whose planning and organizing would eventually manifest as the European Union understood 
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that financial concerns were fundamental to the success of a unified Europe. The union itself was 
built around business partnerships as much as it was built on political partnerships (McCormick, 
2010). Nations who were interdependent on each other financially would be unlikely –or, for all 
practical  considerations,  unable-  to  wage  war  on  each  other  (McCormick,  2010).  The 
prototypical partnerships underpinning the European Union were based on commerce and trade; 
the most important trade partnerships also happened to involve the fundamental materials of war. 
Steel, coal, and energy are all commodities that serve as critical components of military action; 
countries which operate in partnership where these material are concerned are unlikely to have 
any interest in attacking each other; in a sense, they would be attacking themselves (Tavlas, 
2004). 
 
II. Common Currency, Common Goals 
The adoption of a common currency by the member nations of a unified Europe certainly 
seemed like a logical step towards solidifying that union (Tavlas, 2004), while if each member 
nation of a unified Europe had a different currency, that “union” would be little more than 
nominal (Hitchens, 2005). Though any number of political alliances could be (and were) formed, 
disunity in the financial sector would have very real, practical implications. A common currency 
for a European Union potentially solved many problems. Trade among nations with different 
currencies can be hampered in several ways, the most obvious of which has to do with exchange 
rates. Around the world, individual currencies constantly ebb and flow in terms of value; though 
these fluctuations are often relatively minor, they do mean that the exchange of one currency for 
another is not something that can be done instantaneously (Anon, 2005). In every transaction 
involving the exchange of one currency for another, or more specifically, the sale of goods 
valued in one currency to a purchaser paying for those goods with a different currency- requires 
the calculation of the rate of exchange between the two currencies (Anon., 2005).  
In the financial world, time is money, and anything that slows a financial transaction will 
add  cost  to  that  transaction.  This  is  exactly  why  some  currencies  that  are  considered  to  be 
relatively stable in value –such as the dollar- are used as a common medium of exchange among 
many nations whose primary currency is not the dollar (Marzinotto, 2011). Those nations must 
still deal with exchange rates between their currency and the dollar, but their overall international 
trade can still be conducted in the common lingua franca of the market in which they conduct 
business.  The  adoption  of  a  common  currency  among  the  member  nations  of  the  Eurozone 
allows them to forego the constant exchange of individual currencies with an outside common 
currency  (such  as  the  dollar)  or  with  the  range  of  different  currencies  of  other  nations 
(Marzinotto, 2011). 
An  adjunct  to  the  way  the  currency  commonality  can  facilitate  the  ease  with  which 
transaction can take place, and exchange can be largely avoided, is that a common currency 
makes  the  flow  of  transactional  information  smoother  and  more  efficient  (Anon.,  2005).  A 
common currency means that the prices of goods and services can be easily understood and 
considered when decisions are being made. It is critical for trade partners to understand the price 
and  value  of  trade  commodities;  where  international  trade  among  nations  with  different 
currencies  is  concerned,  the  exchange  of  information  regarding  value  and  price  is  not 
instantaneous (McCormick, 2011). Calculating price information is another operation that takes 
time; in the financial sector, anything that slows the processing of information is a net negative. 
Just as the exchange of currencies can add cost to a transaction, so too can the exchange of 
information. 
The European Union was designed to eliminate most of the trade barriers that stood 
between member nations (Krok-Paskowska, 2005). While the adoption of a common currency 5 
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could –and eventually did- eliminate many of the elements that added friction to the smooth flow 
of wealth and information, there were also political measures taken that further lessened potential 
stumbling blocks. Products that had to meet certain national standards, for example, might be 
difficult to import or export among some nations. If beer made in the Netherlands did not meet 
German standards for beer, then that beer could not be sold in Germany. The trade restrictions 
pursuant to this transaction, when lifted, could –and did- allow beer from the Netherlands to be 
sold in Germany. Multiply the elimination of this type of trade restriction across virtually all 
extant  trade  barriers,  and  it  becomes  easy  to  see  how  valuable  the  adoption  of  a  common 
currency could be to a unified Europe (McCormick, 2010). 
 
III. The euro: the Dream and the Reality 
The  group  of  nations  that  have  adopted  the  euro  is  known,  collectively,  as  the 
“Eurozone.”  Joining  the  Eurozone  initially  involved  the  meeting  of  certain  “convergence 
criteria” (McCormick, 2010); these criteria specified the financial expectations and limitations 
imposed on each nation that wished to adopt the euro. In order to become a member of the 
Eurozone, each nation was expected to hit certain economic targets; these criteria were primarily 
related to the amount of debt each nation held, the ration of this debt to GDP, and the amount of 
future debt each member nation could take on (McCormick, 2010). As the original target date for 
the transition to the euro approached, a concern arose among several nations that not all nations 
would be able to meet the goals of the convergence criteria. In the face of this looming problem, 
the Stability and Growth Pact was drawn up (Anon., 2009). This agreement among Eurozone 
members asserted the responsibility of member nations to meet the convergence criteria or risk 
serious penalty; the pact appeared to ease the tensions imposed by the impending adoption of the 
euro, and on January 1
st, 1999, the process of converting from the individual currencies of the 
Eurozone nations to the common euro currency began (Anon., 2009). 
While the adoption of the euro was not without its problems, the transition was, on the 
whole, remarkably smooth. As the European Union was cemented by the euro, the economy of 
the EU became the largest market in the world, and the euro itself became one of the world’s 
leading currencies (McCormick, 2010). Not every member nation of the EU has adopted the 
euro,  but  most  have,  and  barring  unforeseen  circumstances  (such  as  the  ones  that  currently 
threaten to derail the euro) the entire EU will likely use the common currency at some point in 
the future. Just as it was the economic partnership that in large part gave the EU its political 
stability, however, it is the current state of economic disarray that threatens to tear that political 
unity asunder. 
 
IV. Stumbling Blocks 
Perhaps the greatest blunder committed by the EU was the acceptance of Greece into the 
union (Maurizio, 2011). Ignoring their own standards as delineated in the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the EU allowed Greece to join the EU despite the fact that Greece did not meet those 
standards (McCormick, 2010). Further complicating the issue was the fact that Greece’s avowed 
financials were actually much worse than even the poor figures to which they had attested when 
they joined (Lorca-Susino, 2011). The economic and political malfeasance committed by Greece 
in order to gain entry into the EU had serious consequences; the euro and the entire EU economy 
were badly shaken by the effects of Greece’s economic turbulence (Lorca-Susino, 2011). Their 
membership in the EU has been problematic from the start, and the EU has had to make various 
concessions and proffer billions of dollars in bailouts to Greece not just to keep that nation 
afloat, but to ensure that a sinking Greece does not bring down the entire EU with it (Maurizio, 
2011).  6 
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The economic woes in Greece have been the greatest single threat to the euro and to the 
EU to date, though the worsening economic situations in other nations are also starting to tear at 
the fabric of the EU. In recent months the political and financial leadership of the EU member 
nations have taken measures both large and small in efforts to shore up and stabilize Greece’s 
economy and to address the overarching problems faced by the EU. Despite the best efforts and 
best intentions of all involved, however, each step, in the end, appears to be too small, too 
incremental, and too safe to have any significant impact on the overall economic picture in the 
EU.  
The seemingly-endless series of crises in Greece have probably been the biggest issues 
that  the  Eurozone  has  faced,  but  Greece  is  not  the  only  nation  in  the  Eurozone  that  is 
experiencing  economic  troubles.  None  of  the  Eurozone  nations  are  exactly  burgeoning 
economically at the moment, and some, such as Spain and Italy, are experiencing economic 
turmoil that threatens to rival that of Greece. The efforts to assist and even bail out Greece have 
been  ongoing,  yet  every  unit  of  foreign  currency  that  pours  into  Greece  seems  to  simply 
disappear into a financial abyss (Ohlenburg, 2011).  Fairly recent attempts to shore up the Greek 
economy,  and  to  ostensibly  avoid  seeing  the  kinds  of  problems  that  Greece  has  faced  start 
happening in other nations, have failed completely, and many economists are pessimistic about 
the idea of attempting further bailouts (Ohlenburg, 2011). Though there are no mechanisms in 
place for the ejection of a nation from the EU, some both from within and from outside Greece 
are suggesting that the nation be ousted (perhaps only temporarily) from the Eurozone to avoid 
the potential “contagion” of Greece’s troubles reaching other members of the Eurozone (Javier, 
2011).  
 
V. More Questions than Answers 
The  situation  in  the  Eurozone  is  extraordinarily  complex;  as  such,  there  are  no  easy 
answers or quick fixes. Attempting to determine what should be done to right the ship of the EU 
economy is an equally difficult proposition; for every problem faced by the EU and the Eurozone 
there are multiple answers about how to address that problem. Some economists believe that it is 
simply time to give up, asserting that the euro is doomed, while others insist that there are critical 
measures to be taken that, while possibly painful for the average European, could salvage the 
economic and political unions buttressing the European economy (Maurizio, 2011). 
Efforts  to  assess  the  economic  situation  in  the  EU  are  hampered  by  the  fact  that 
circumstances are shifting so quickly: what seemed plausible and even helpful one week might 
seem implausible and even dangerous the next, while what seemed impossible yesterday is now 
possible today. One recent development is that the European Central Bank has hinted that they 
are perhaps willing to step in to resolve the debt crisis (Ewing, 2011). Further intimations have 
recently come from French president Nicolas Sarkozy and German chancellor Angela Merkel 
that there is a political census coalescing around the idea of an agreement that might spur the 
ECB to act (Ewing, 2011).  
A proposal to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact that would give the more stable of 
the Eurozone nations the power to vet and approve the national budgets of those member nations 
that are experiencing trouble is gaining traction; such an agreement might be enough to convince 
the ECB to intervene on behalf of the euro (Ewing, 2011). Speaking about the consequences, of 
inaction, Sarkozy said “the disappearance of the euro would make our debt unmanageable” and 
create “a loss of confidence that would lead to paralysis and the impoverishment of France” 
(Ewing,  2011).  Mario  Draghi,  the  recently-installed  head  of  the  European  Central  Bank, 
expressed a willingness to intervene in the European debt crisis, suggesting that the economic 7 
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and  political  partnerships  underpinning  the  EU  could  survive  if  the  proper  steps  are  taken 
(Ewing, 2011). 
 “What I believe our economic and monetary union needs is a new fiscal compact — a 
fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules together with the mutual fiscal commitments that euro 
area governments have made,” Draghi said recently. Such a compact is “definitely the most 
important element to start restoring credibility. Other elements might follow, but the sequencing 
matters.”  Draghi  tempered  his  assertion  by  insisting  that,  even  under  these  conditions,  any 
assistance from the ECB should be “temporary and limited” (Ewing, 2011). The political and 
economic implications involved in the suggestions from Sarkozy are significant, and may serve 
to derail any possible agreements. As laid out thus far, the proposed agreement to allow member 
nations such as Germany to oversee the budgets of other member nations would represent a 
significant abdication of national sovereignty for those nations; as such, there is no guarantee 
that all parties would agree to those provisions. 
There is also no guarantee that such agreements, or the proposed actions from the ECB, 
will be enough to stem the flow of blood seeing from the wounded European economy. While 
the focus has been on Greece’s economic problems, that is not the only nation experiencing 
economic troubles. Along with Greece, both Spain and Italy are seeing their debts piling up as 
their economic growth dwindles. Some economists are predicting that Italy is, in fact, on the 
verge of collapse, and that there are few, if any, measures that could be taken to prevent it (Ricci, 
2011). If Greece were to default, assert some economists, the EU could ultimately absorb the 
costs and the losses, while a collapse of Italy would present a situation that is too big to be 
absorbed, and that could bring about the collapse of the entire European economy (Ricci, 2011). 
 
VI. Common Currency, Common Sense 
While the situation in the EU is currently tumultuous, it is not unreasonable to hope that 
this crisis will be surmounted and that the EU will survive. There is no question that the current 
economic troubles are quite serious, but there is also no question that the member nations of the 
EU –and the individual citizens of those nations- are heavily invested financially, politically, and 
emotionally in maintain the union. The economy is the main problem faced by the EU at the 
moment, but economics are also at the heart of the “union” in the European Union. The adoption 
of  a  common  currency  had  a  significant  psychological  impact  on  the  citizens  of  Europe 
(McCormick, 2010). Just as trade between nations in the EU was simplified and streamlined by 
the adoption of the EU, so too has travel between the nations been simplified as tourists do not 
have to deal with constantly-fluctuating exchange rates among different currencies.  Individuated 
currencies served as a reminder of the differences between those of different nationalities; the 
adoption of the euro has highlighted that which European citizens have in common (McCormick, 
2010). 
The  adoption  of  the  euro  has  created  a  larger  psychological  impact  as  well,  as  the 
member nations of the EU now have a vested interest in the economic success not just of their 
own nations, but of the other member nations as well (McCormick, 2010). The upshot of this 
psychological  effect  means  that  the  member  nations  have,  thus  far,  demonstrated  their 
willingness –within reason- to bail out those nations that are currently flailing. The situation in 
the Eurozone is changing not just from day to day, but literally from hour to hour. As the EU 
inches closer to the precipice, however, more and more political and economic leaders –who may 
have simply been waiting to see what action was taken by others- are now coming forward with 
suggestions  and  proposals  that  could  help  avoid  disaster.  Even  the  U.S.  has  expressed  its 
willingness to help; the Federal Reserve Bank recently allowed the EDC to hold billions on U.S. 
dollars  against  the  service  of  debt  that  shored  up  the  euro  for  approximately  seven  days  (a 8 
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lifetime during a crisis of this magnitude) (Maurizio, 2011). The EU and the U.S. have had a bit 
of a rocky relationship over the years as the foreign policies of the two political powers diverged 
significantly in the aftermath of U.S. occupations in the Middle East (Larive, 2011). Despite 
these differences, the EU and the U.S. are economically intertwined; the collapse of the EU 
would have significant and dire consequences not just for EU members, but for the U.S. as well. 
It is entirely within the realm of possibility that by the time this paper is read some sort of 
conclusion will have been reached, or some incident or incidents that carry the air of finality will 
have transpired, that will render all of the speculation and discussion contained herein entirely 
moot. In the face of all of the available evidence, a sense of foreboding, of impending doom, 
hangs over the EU like a storm cloud. Through the gathering storm, however, signs of light are 
emerging. The recent comments from political leaders such as the French President and the 
German Chancellor, as well as the pronouncements from the leader of the ECB, are the first real 
signs of hope for the euro and for the EU that have come along in months.  
As the EU leaders gather to discuss ways to save the union and fend off the potential 
collapse of the Eurozone, another bright spot has emerged. In a recent interview, the Minister of 
Economy for Bulgaria, Traicho Traikov, announced publicly that the tiny nation fully intends to 
follow through on its bid to enter the EU. Since 1997, claims Traikov, Bulgaria set about to align 
its national budget with the specific requirements of the EU’s convergence criteria. Despite being 
one of the poorest nations in the region –and it will be the poorest in the EU if it is allowed to 
join- Bulgaria has done the remarkable: it has not only met the criteria specified by the EU, it has 
exceeded them. For almost every year since 1997, Bulgaria has actually run a budget surplus, an 
amazing accomplishment in these trying economic times. If Bulgaria is the future of the EU, then 
perhaps the future does not look so bleak after all. Yes, there are still many things that could go 
wrong. Waving away those dire warnings, minister Traikov claims not to be worried about the 
future of the EU. His final comment on the fate of the European Union? “I think common sense 
will prevail.”  
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